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Data Investigation

Bolivia's government admits cyberattacks.

Two of the four institutions named by Hacking Bolivia acknowledge incidents. No authority confirms how much data left.

By — Tecnóloga Creativa

On 17 November Bolivia's government admits cyberattacks against state institutions. Senarecom confirms unauthorised access to its Sinacom system. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges an incident on 16 November. The collective Hacking Bolivia reports on 15 November the sale of databases from four institutions. No authority confirms how much data left.

Document:
Statement (Comunicado)
Signed by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Date:
La Paz, 16 November 2026
Works with:
AGETIC
Confirms:
An information security incident
Leaves open:
Whether unauthorised access or exposure of information took place

What does the government admit?

Presidential spokesperson José Luis Gálvez speaks at a press conference on Tuesday 17 November. He acknowledges "hacking attempts" and the offer of information on the dark web. He says AGETIC is sizing up the problem and taking security measures over the incidents at the Foreign Ministry and at Senarecom's Sinacom system.

"This is a problem that is going to be recurrent."

Gálvez blames earlier administrations for the decline of the state's information security. He announces measures to reinforce public systems. He gives no detail. He gives no figures and does not confirm that data left.

What does Senarecom confirm?

It confirms unauthorised access to Sinacom, the national information system on mineral trade and exports. It says that, on a preliminary basis, its online services operate normally.

The agency investigates the scope and checks the integrity of the recorded information. In the coming days it asks traders and users for the supporting documents of their operations. It instructs them to keep those documents on paper and in digital form.

Senarecom does not say whether data left the system. The Hacking Bolivia report attributes 654,414 exposed records to it.

What does the Foreign Ministry confirm?

It confirms an incident. It activates response and containment protocols. It works with AGETIC, the state agency for electronic government, to strengthen the security of its services.

The statement names no affected system. It gives no date for the incident or for its detection. On the causes, the Ministry writes:

Any conclusion on the causes "will be communicated when duly verified information exists".

What does Hacking Bolivia report?

Document:
Official Statement No. 2026-34
Signed by:
Hacking Bolivia, a digital security awareness collective
Date:
La Paz, 15 November 2026
Addressed to:
The public, the FELCC and DIGIPOL police units, the Ministry of Government and the media
Subject:
Red alert over a mass leak and illicit sale of sensitive data of the Plurinational State

The collective posts the alert on its X account on Sunday 15 November at 10.30 pm. It describes a coordinated campaign of cyberattacks and the offer of databases on underground forums. It names four institutions.

Reported by Hacking Bolivia · no independent verification

619,143
files · more than 170 GB
Foreign Ministry
Passports, visas and financial records of foreign nationals
654,414
records
Senarecom
Clients and buyers of minerals, with bank accounts
6 GB
or more of internal documents
Army
Manuals, intelligence lists and organisational charts
2,652
records
Senate
Personal data and addresses of legislative staff

Figures from Hacking Bolivia Official Statement No. 2026-34. No institution confirms them as of 17 November.

InstitutionData reportedVolume
Ministry of Foreign AffairsFiles on foreign nationals: passports, visas, proof of financial solvency619,143 files, more than 170 GB
Senarecom, the state minerals trade registryClients and buyers of gold, silver, tin and zinc: settlements, weights, mineral grades, taxes, bank accounts654,414 records
ArmyInternal documents: war manuals, cyberdefence material, intelligence lists, organisational charts of special unitsMore than 6 GB
SenateLegislative staff: personal data, addresses, background records2,652 records

What does AGETIC say?

In the press we reviewed up to 18 November, no AGETIC official speaks on the record by name and title. What is known of its work comes through the presidential spokesperson.

Gálvez says the agency is sizing up the problem, taking preventive measures and preserving the traces the attackers leave. The government expects a detailed report from it. There is no delivery date.

Carlos Olivera, a former AGETIC director, points to the agency's statements on X: they announce measures without saying which incidents they respond to. Olivera calls for a modern personal data protection law.

In October 2025, facing another leak, Franz Rojas, head of the agency's incident response centre, gives an interview to the news agency ANF and explains the cause.

What does the rule require?

Supreme Decree 2514 of 9 September 2015 creates AGETIC and its incident response centre, the Centro de Gestión de Incidentes Informáticos (CGII). Article 17, amended by Supreme Decree 5519 of January 2026, obliges the security officers of every public institution to report an incident to the CGII within 24 hours of learning of it.

That report goes from the institution to the CGII. The Hacking Bolivia report is dated 15 November.

Is the leak verified?

In part. Two of the four institutions acknowledge incidents: the Foreign Ministry and Senarecom. Neither confirms the extraction of data or the figures in the report.

Hacking Bolivia says it has confirmed the data is up for sale. Its statement includes no samples and no proof of authenticity.

The Army and the Senate remain silent. The outlet CiberLATAM rates the attribution in the Senate case as weak, because nobody has validated the content.

We reviewed the two original statements and the press coverage. sala.red does not download or inspect the files offered on those forums.

What does the collective demand?

  • A block on the sales and tracing of the group's cryptocurrency.
  • Urgent security audits, above all at Senarecom and the Foreign Ministry.
  • A warning to the public and the mining sector about the risk of scams, identity theft and extortion.

Which law protects this data?

No general law. Bolivia has no personal data protection law. No rule obliges the state to notify people when their data is exposed.

AGETIC presents a draft bill in 2024. The law remains unapproved.

At sala.red we have been calling for a personal data protection law. The files in the report contain passports, bank accounts and home addresses.

Is this the first time?

No. In October 2025 AGETIC admits that outsiders reached documents through a credential stolen with malware. It rates the risk as low.

In November 2025 the Observatorio de Delitos Informáticos de Bolivia (ODIB) reports the alleged sale of 10,335,788 citizen records, attributed to the central citizen registry and the Ministry of Health.

Hacking Bolivia tells Urgente.bo that at least 30 public institutions have suffered attacks since last year. It names the one against Segip, the identity agency, as the largest.

Timeline

  • 3 October 2025. AGETIC admits a document leak through a compromised credential.
  • 25 November 2025. ODIB warns of the alleged sale of more than 10 million citizen records.
  • 11 November 2026. A threat monitor logs the offer of a database attributed to the Senate.
  • 15 November 2026, 10.30 pm. Hacking Bolivia posts its statement No. 2026-34.
  • 16 November 2026. The Foreign Ministry acknowledges an information security incident.
  • 17 November 2026. The presidential spokesperson admits the attacks. Senarecom confirms unauthorised access to Sinacom.

What remains unanswered

  • Which Foreign Ministry systems are affected, and since when?
  • Did anyone reach the visa and passport files of foreign nationals?
  • Did data leave Sinacom? Did anyone alter its records?
  • Do the Army and the Senate detect intrusions in their systems?
  • When does AGETIC deliver its report, and who publishes it?
  • Do the four institutions report to the CGII within 24 hours?
  • Who investigates: the FELCC, DIGIPOL, the public prosecutor?
  • Does the state notify the people whose data appears in the report?

Sources

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